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A more detailed version of this paper has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. This work was partially supported by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF) under contract No. 92/32575. to have full access to the communication links and the shared keys are either shared between pairs of nodes, or all of the nodes. Furthermore, the network topology of index coding is a special case of wireline networks. While there are many works addressing the security aspects of wireline networks in various settings (see [6] for a comprehensive overview of the literature), as far as we know, none of the works in the literature study how the secrecy region changes with different criteria in secrecy constraints in the secure network coding problem.
Our contribution: In this paper, we consider a general wireline network consisting of sources, intermediate nodes, and sinks, which are interconnected by error-free links. The links are directional with given capacities. Thus, wireline network can be represented by a directed weighted graph. This graph is allowed to have directed cycles. The source nodes have messages that are desired by sink nodes. Moreover, nodes in the network have access to infinite private randomness (only available to the nodes themselves), and also a number of ratelimited shared keys. Each key is shared among a subset of nodes. These secret keys are helpful in hiding the messages from an eavesdropper who has access to a subset of links.
Our main result is to show that changing weak to perfect condition and -error to zero-error constraint, does not affect the achievable secure rate region of linear network coding (if nodes are restricted to linear operations). When the nodes are allowed to do non-linear operations, we show that weak and strong secrecy are equivalent.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, some notation is fixed, and the system model is defined. Section III lays out the main results. Parts of the proofs are given here; see [7] for the full proofs.
Notation 
Whether M is a set or a vector is clarified in the context. The total variation distance between two pmfs p X and q X is defined as
We use 1[·] to denote the indicator function. Finally, all the logarithms in this paper are in base two. 
The wireline network we consider in this paper consists of source nodes, receiver nodes (sink nodes) and some intermediate relay nodes. The nodes are interconnected by error-free point-to-point links. In addition, there exists an eavesdropper who is able to hear some of the links. Each source node has access to a subset of message set M. Similarly, each sink node desires to obtain a subset of messages. There is also a set of keys The edges of the wireline network have limited capacity. For a code of blocklength n, an edge with capacity C e can carry at most n(C e + n ) bits where n converges to zero as n tends to infinity. Similarly, if the rate of message M i is R Mi , then in a code of blocklength n, M i is a binary sequence of length nR Mi . The same can be said of the rate of the shared keys R Ki . The goal of the nodes of the network is to maximize the communication rates R Mi while minimizing the key rates R Ki as much as possible in such a way that the desired reliability and security conditions are met. 1 The resulting fundamental trade-off between R Mi and R Ki describes the capacity region of the problem.
Fixing a coding strategy by the nodes in the network, the eavesdropper will end up with a collection of observations from the network. We use the random variable C to denote all the information the eavesdropper has obtained. Random variable C is a function of M, K and W, i.e.,
In linear network coding, we assume that there is a finite field F. Each variable M i , K i and W i is a string of independent and uniformly distributed symbols from field F. All the coding operations are restricted to taking weighted linear combinations in F. Then, eavesdropper's information C can be expressed as
where
T , and A, B and G are some coefficient matrices.
Secrecy conditions: -Perfect Secrecy M and C are independent, or equivalently,
1 Private randomness is commonly considered as a free resource and studying its rate is not of interest.
-Strong secrecy
There are two definitions of -strong secrecy in the literature [8] [9, Lemma 1]: given 1 > 0, the first definition requires that
The second definition of strong secrecy requires a bound on the total variation distance. Given some 2 > 0, we require 
It follows from the above definitions that perfect secrecy condition (2) is stronger than strong secrecy condition (3), which in turn is stronger than weak secrecy constraint (5).
III. MAIN RESULTS

A. Results for linear codes
Theorem 1 (From strong secrecy to perfect secrecy for linear codes). Take an arbitrary linear code C , with adversary observing C as defined in (1) . If the strong secrecy constraint I(M; C) ≤ holds for some < 1 or p MC − p M p C 1 ≤ holds for some < 1/2, then the code C is also perfect secure.
Theorem 2 (From -error to zero-error for linear codes). Take an arbitrary linear code C over a finite field F. If the average error probability of a sink node is less than 1 − 1/|F|, then the error probability of the sink node has to be zero. In order to prove Theorem 3, we need tools from random binning of sources.
B. Result for linear and non-linear codes
C. Tools from Random Binning
Random binning: Random binning is a random function like B : M →M which uniformly and independently maps each symbol m ∈ M to a symbolm ∈M. In linear random binning, the mapping function B is linear. Moreover, in distributed random binning, there are a set of random functions
where each B i is a random binning function and B i 's are mutually independent.
Output Statistics of Random Binning Output Statistics of Random Binning (OSRB) is a tool introduced in [8] to describe the joint pmf of bin indices of multiple random variables.
Moreover, we assume that distributed random binning function 
where 
the expected value of the total variation of the joint pmf
tends to zero as n approaches infinity:
In the above equation, refers to the uniform distribution on the bin index set [2 nRi ].
To prove Theorem 3, we state and prove the following improved version of the OSRB theorem which states that not only the average of the total variation distance in (6) converges to zero, but also exponentially fast:
Theorem 5. Assuming that all the random variables in the statement of Theorem 4 take values in finite sets, the expected value of the total variation of the joint pmf P (c n ,m) from the
tends to zero, exponentially fast as 2 −κn for some constant κ, as n approaches infinity. 
D. Simulation from bin index
Assume that X is distributed uniformly on some alphabet set, and let X n be an i.i.d. repetition of X. Let B = B(x n ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 nR − 1} be a random binning of X n at rate R. Given any particular realization of the binning, we end up with some joint distribution p BX n where B is a function of X n . From this joint distribution, we can consider the conditional pmf p X n |B . Observe that multiple X n may be mapped to B = b, hence, p X n |B is not a deterministic channel. We now ask for the minimum random bit rate required to simulate the channel p X n |B as defined by Steinberg and Verdu in [10] . In particular, if we denote the simulated channel byp X n |B , we define the total variation distance p B p X n |B −p BpX n |B 1 as a measure of accuracy of channel simulation [10] . The following theorem shows that the rate log |X | − R + δ (for any δ > 0) is sufficient with high probability. 
Given any realization of the binning, a deterministic simulation function φ(T, B) imposes the channel
Then, we claim one can find a deterministic simulation function φ for any realization of the binning such that
converges to zero exponentially fast in n for some η > 0.
Furthermore, if the binning from X n to B is linear, then one can find a deterministic linear simulation function φ(T, B)
satisfying the desired property.
IV. PROOFS
Below, we give the proof of Theorems 1 and 3. The proof of Theorem 2 and Theorems 5-7 can be found in the extended version [7] .
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that I(M; C) > 0 where C = AM + BK + GW. We will show that I(M; C) ≥ 1 and p MC − p M p C 1 ≥ 1/2. This will conclude the proof.
Assume that C is a column vector of size k. We claim that one can find a non-zero column vector z of size k such that us call the image of [B, G] by I , which is a linear subspace of F k . Since elements of vectors K and W are independently and uniformly distributed over F, BK + GW will be uniformly distributed over I . Just like Shannon's one-time-pad strategy, this will imply that C = AM + (BK + GW) will be independent of AM, and masked by BK+GW. To see this, note that for any value of M = m, we have Am ∈ I and the vector C = Am + BK + GW will be uniformly distributed over I as well. This is because I = Am + I since I is a linear subspace. As a result, the conditional distribution p(C|m) does not depend on the value of m. Hence, perfect secrecy condition holds. But this contradicts our assumption that I(M; C) > 0. Thus, we can conclude that there is a non-zero column vector z of size k such that
where in (a), we used the fact that M has uniform distribution, and hence (z † A)M is a uniformly distributed symbol in F.
, observe thatM =Ĉ is a uniform symbol in F. Then, we can write
where step (a) follows from the data processing property of total variation distance (see e.g. [11] ), which states that for any channel p(y|x) we have
where p(y) = x p(x)p(y|x) and q(y) = x q(x)p(y|x). We get our desired inequality if we set the alphabet X to be the alphabet of (M, C), p(x) = p(m, c), q(x) = p(m)p(c), and p(y|x) to be the application of functions f and g applied on the M and C parts of X, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose we have a code C satisfying the weak secrecy condition with parameter a . Also assume that the error probability of the code is b . Assume that there are u sink nodes and message M i is desired by sinks
Let us denote byM ij to be the reconstruction of M i by sink j ∈ T i . Since the error probability of the code C is b , By Fano's inequality, we have
Assume that we independently run the above code n times. In other words, instead of considering one copy of message
. For each of the n copies of the messages, we run the given code and the sinks produce reconstructionŝ
, j ∈ T i . We call this expansion n i.i.d. repetitions of the code and denote it by C n . Observe that the rate of the expanded code C n is equal to the rate of the original code C , because even though the links in the network are used n times a single code, but the message communicated over the network is also multiplied by n. Similarly, the rates of secret keys shared among the network nodes remain unchanged. By summing up the weak secrecy conditions I(M(i);
We see that the weak secrecy condition holds with the same parameter a for C n . However, the error probability of the expanded code C n is higher, because C n will be in error if an error occurs in any of the n iterations of the code.
Let R i = log |M i |. This quantity is proportional to R Mi of code C . In fact, if code C consists of k uses of the network, then R Mi = R i /k is the message sent per network use. Let
where δ was defined in (8 
then, one can find κ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n
Observe that (11) holds by the choice ofR i and R Fi given in (9) and (10).
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Next, we want to define some Slepian-Wolf decoders. Csiszár in [12, Theorem 1, 3] proves the existence of error exponents for the the Slepian-Wolf theorem [13] for random non-linear and linear binning. This result implies that we can recover M i ([n]) from bin index F i and side information M ij ([n]) for any j ∈ T i with error probability of at most 2 −βin for some β i > 0 if R Fi > H(M i |M ij ) and n is sufficiently large. Note that the probability of success of the Slepian-Wolf decoder is computed by taking the statistical average over all random binnings. Observe that R Fi given in (10) satisfies this inequality because of (7) and (8) . Now, we construct a new code C as follows: the i-th message is denoted by M i and is uniformly distributed over a set of size 2 nRi . The nodes of the network also have shared keys of the same length as they have in C n . Let us assume that the source nodes who obtain the i-th message M i share an additional common secret key of rate R Gi (of negligible rate):
The secret key R Gi is used by the source nodes who obtain the i-th 
